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BURDEN OF PROOF IN LABOR ARBITRATIONS
By JACK H. CHA~mEs*
The concept of burden of proof is well established in our com-
mon law system of jurisprudence. The purpose of this paper is to
consider the extent to which that concept has been introduced into
labor arbitration proceedings, and the propriety and manner of its
use in such proceedings.
There are many valid objections to the use of technical rules of
evidence and other legal formalisms in arbitration hearings.' Bur-
den of proof has never been specifically objected to, however, and
the writers generally seem to have accepted the concept's usefulness
in arbitrations.2 A typical rationale seems to be that "since arbi-
trations are adversary proceedings, one party or the other must
'prove his case,' which requires consideration of the burden of
proof.'"3
But have the arbitrators accepted burden of proof as a useful
tool to be used in hearings before them q It is true that the greater
number of arbitration opinions do not even mention burden of
proof.4 This may largely be explained by the fact that burden of
proof has no effect on the final outcome of a large majority of cases,
whether at law or in arbitration.5 And in arbitrations there is the
additional factor that many arbitrators wish to make it perfectly
clear that the case was decided on its merits rather than on any
legal technicalities in order to avoid arousing the natural suspicion
of parties involved who have no legal training. These two factors
may go a long way toward explaining why burden of proof is not
more frequently spoken of in the reported arbitration decisions.
* 3rd year law student, Duke University; A.B. Duke, 1951.
See, for example, Singer, Labor Arbitration: Should It Be Formal or
Informal, 2 L. L. J. 89 (1951); Mayer, Judicial "Bulls" in the Delicate China
Slwp of Labor Arbitration, 2 L. L. J. 502 (1951).
2 ELxouRi, How AaBITRATiOx WoRxs (1952), pp. 164-168; GOLLUB, DIS-
oHAnE F0a CAUsE (1946), p. 14; UPDEGRAPF' AND McCoY, ABIiTR.ATioN or
LABon Dis uTrs (1946), p. 96; Beck, Evidence, Burden and Quantum of Proof,
1949 WAsH. U. L. Q. 89.
Beck, op. cit., p. 89.
'Of approximately 300 arbitration opinions reported in volume 19 of the
Labor Arbitration Reports and the first 350 pages of volume 20 of those Re-
ports, only some 30 eases speak of burden of proof.
UpDEenArr AN McCoy op. cit. supra note 2 at p. 96.
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Taking these factors into consideration, a sufficient number of arbi-
tration reports speak of burden of proof to indicate that it is a
matter at least worthy of consideration. Before reaching any true
estimate of the value of burden of proof in this field, however, we
must examine some of the particular situations in which it has been
applied. This paper will not attempt to investigate all the possible
situations where questions of burden of proof arises. Instead, we
will look at the instances where the question has arisen with suffi-
cient frequency to present a fair number of decisions on which to
base our discussion.
During our examination it will be well to keep in mind the
generally accepted maxim that the party asserting the affirmative
of an issue has the burden of proof.' The principle sounds disarm-
ingly simple. Its application is alarmingly difficult. As Wigmore
says:
"The truth is that there is not and cannot be any one gen-
eral solvent for all cases. It is merely a question of policy
and fairness based on experience in the different situa-
tions."z
Arbitrability
In investigating a few of the "different situations" which may
arise in labor arbitrations, it seems appropriate to begin with the
issue of arbitrability. Before any dispute may be settled by arbi-
tration it must be demonstrated that the question is one which the
parties have contracted to submit to arbitration. In determining
whether an issue has properly been submitted to their jurisdiction,
arbitrators have generally said that unless the issue is one specifi-
cally submitted to arbitration by the terms of the contract, the
party asserting the authority of the arbitrator has the burden of
proof.8  Where the matter is specifically made arbitrable by the
contract, any party asserting oral modification of the written con-
tract or waiver of its provisions has the burden of proof.9
These rules are in accordance with the accepted legal rules
governing interpretation of written contracts. In opposition to the
WiGmom, EviDxcE (3rd ed.), § 2486.
ibid.
8 Jack & Heintz Precision Industries, Inc., 20 LA 289, 293 (1952) ; Water-
front Employers Ass'n of the Pacific Coast, 2 ALAA par. 67, 779 (1953);
The Flintkote Co., 3 LA 723 (1946).
9S. Karpen & Bros., 12 LA 276 (1949), involving oral modification of a
written contract; Super-Cold Corp., 8 LA 187 (1947), waiver.
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application of ordinary rules in this field, it could be argued that
the general policy favoring industrial peace warrants placing the
burden on the party denying arbitrability in all cases. This argu-
ment has met with no success. Its failure may be explicable on the
basis of a general feeling that, where the matter is not clearly
assigned to arbitration under the terms of the contract, collective
bargaining by the parties is preferable to the decision of a third
party.10
Promotion and Lay-off
The decisions as to who has the burden of proof in cases involv-
ing challenged promotions or lay-offs are by no means uniform."
The different results as to who should bear the burden may largely
be explained in terms of the contract clause involved in each case.
The great majority of contract clauses limiting management's rights
to promote, demote or lay-off emphasize either seniority or ability,
or both. For our purposes, these clauses may be divided into two
general groups, those which emphasize seniority as at least a factor
equal to ability, and those which make ability the primary con-
sideration with seniority only a matter of secondary import. To
the writer it appears that where the burden of proof is placed has
been made to turn on which of these groups the contract clause
involved falls within. Where the contract clause makes seniority
the dominant factor and provides that only something near equal
ability is required, the burden of proof is generally said to be on
the company to prove that its failure to act strictly on the basis of
seniority was justified. 2 On the other hand, where the contract
provides that promotions or lay-offs shall be according to skill,
ability and seniority, with the latter being decisive only if the first
two are equal, the union has the burden to show that the allegedly
aggrieved individuals were of equal ability.13 Similarly, where the
only duty on the management is to make promotions in good faith,
the union has the burden of proving lack of good faith.14
10 Jack & Heintz Precision Industries, Inc., supra at note 8.
1 ELKOURI, op. cit. supra at note 2, p. 164.
12 Quaker Shipyard and Machine Co., 19 LA 883, 887, 888 (1952); Campbell
Soup Co., 19 LA 1 (1952); Seeger Refrigerator Co., 16 LA 525, 529 (1951);
Darin & Armstrong, 13 LA 843, 846 (1950); Columbia Steel Co., 13 LA 666,
668 (1949); Chrysler Corp., 5 LA 333 (1946); Ford Motor Co., 2 LA 374
(1945).
13 International Paper Co., 19 LA 403 (1952) ; Merrill Stevens Dry Dock &
Repair Co., 17 LA 516 (1951); Republic Steel Corp., 17 LA 105, 109 (1951);
Combustion Engineering Co., 0 LA 515 (1948).
14 Durham Hosiery Mills, 12 LA 311, 315 (1949).
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This distinction based upon the type of contract clause involved
appears to be a step consonant with the probable intent of the
parties. Where the collective bargaining agreement provides that
seniority is to be the decisive factor unless a difference in ability
is present, the general indication is that in the ordinary situation
promotions or lay-offs are to follow seniority, unless a special reason
for another result is shown. Placing the burden of showing the
special reason on the company is an aid to maintaining seniority
as the general determinant. Conversely, placing the burden of
showing equal ability on the union seems to effectuate the intent of
the parties where they provide that ability is the factor to which
foremost consideration is to be given.
Placing the burden on the union under contract clauses empha-
sizing ability can only be justified, however, if we realize that the
concept of burden of proof is properly composed of two separate
factors, burden of persuasion and burden of going forward with
the evidence. 15 Insofar as the discussion above indicates that in
some situations the burden of proof in promotions or lay-offs is on
the union, the burden is limited to burden of persuasion. To im-
pose also the burden of going forward with the eyidence on the
union would require it to attempt to rebut the company reasons
for finding a difference in ability while the company's basis for its
decision was still unknown. That is to say, the union's evidence in
these cases is chiefly rebuttal, and it would be unfair to require the
union to rebut the company's position without knowledge of the
reasons therefor.'0 Logically, the burden of going forward with
.the evidence should always be imposed on the company in the usual
promotion or lay-off case. Whether this rule would be accepted is
not clear from the arbitrators' reported opinions, since they speak
generally in terms of burden of proof and it is impossible to tell
from the opinions which party made the first presentation of
evidence.
It has been suggested that a management clause in the collective
bargaining agreement is sufficient to place the burden of proof in
promotion cases on the union or employee. 17 Two arbitrators have
mentioned these clauses in placing the burden of proof on the
union,18 but in both cases the contract clause specifically referring
25 WIGMOE, op. cit. supra at note 6, §§ 2497-2498.
2 ELKouaI, op. cit. supra at note 2, p. 165.
1 GOLLUiB, op. cit. supra at note 2, p. 14.
I's Merrill Stevens Dry Dock & Repair Co., 17 LA 516 (1951) ; Combustion
Engineering Co., 9 LA 515 (1948).
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to promotion placed ability first and made seniority only a second-
ary consideration. It is not clear that either decision would have
been different if the management clause had not been present.
'There is no good reason why a general management clause should
affect the burden of proof question if there is a specific contract
clause dealing with promotions or lay-off. It is highly improbable
that the management clause was intended by either party to the
contract to affect the burden of proof or provides reliable indicia
of the attitude of the parties toward the right to promote or lay-off.
The quantum of proof necessary in promotion or lay-off cases
is often not discussed, the arbitrators merely assigning a general
burden of proof. Several formulae have been suggested: "clear
and convincing proof,"1 9 "an unmistakable, readily demonstrable,
major degree of proof,' '20 "the greater weight of the evidence,''21
and "reasonable and substantial proof." 22 It is extremely doubtful
that it would be helpful or possible to establish one talismanic for-
mula to cover all the possible situations.
Discharge
The great majority of arbitration opinions involving discharge
for cause place the burden of sustaining the discharge on the man-
agement. 23  It could be argued that on theory a different result
should have been obtained in these cases. If the arbitration pro-
ceeding is viewed as an attempt to reinstate a discharged employee
the union is affirmatively asserting that the employee should be
returned to his job. Under this analysis the union should bear the
burden of proof since it is making the affirmative assertion. The
argument was properly rejected, however, since the true view is
that the discharge itself is the affirmative action involved, and since
20 Campbell Soup Co., 19 LA 1 (1952); Darin & Armstrong, 13 LA. 843,
846 (1950); Durham Hosiery Mills, 12 LA 311, 315 (1949).
20 Quaker Shipyard & Machine Co., 19 LA 883, 888 (1952).
21 Combustion Engineering Co., 9 LA 515 (1948).
22 Seeger Refrigerator Co., 16 LA 525, 529 (1951).
F or example, Wm. H. Walsh Co., Inc., 20 LA 174 (1953) ; Fairbanks Co.,
20 LA 36 (1951); Ford Motor Co., 20 LA 13 (1952); Crawford Clothes, 19
LA 475, 479 (1952); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 19 LA 413, 415
(1952); Century Foundry, 19 LA 380, 384 (1952); Aviation Maintenance
Corp., 8 LA 261, 268 (1947); American Smelting and Refining Co., 7 LA 147,
150 (1947); American Liberty Oil Co., 5 LA 399 (1946); A. S. Beck Shoe
Corp., 2 LA 212 (1944); Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co., 1 LA 254,
262, 263 (1945).
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the company has made the discharge it must affirmatively support
that action.2-
Other reasons militate toward placing the burden of proof in
the usual discharge case on the management. The management
alone knows the reasons for the discharge and the evidence war-
ranting the action, or at least has better knowledge of these facts.
To require the union to present its evidence first would here, as
in the promotion cases, call upon the union to attempt to rebut all
possible bases for the action. Since it naturally follows that re-
buttal evidence should be the last received, burden of going forward
with the evidence should be on the company. Burden of persuasion
is usually placed on the company in these cases partly as a matter
of construing contract clauses referring to "just cause," and partly
because of the severity of the economic penalty of discharge.
Notwithstanding the general imposition of the burden of proof
on the company in the cases involving discharge, several arbitrators
have reached a contrary decision. A few of these cases may be
explained by the peculiar contract terms involved. 5 Others are
not so easily explained.
In United Air Lines, Ine., 26 the arbitration involved the pro-
priety of a discharge of an airline pilot for incompetency. The
question of burden of proof was strongly contested by the parties.
The arbitrator held that in view of the company's duty to the pub-
lic to provide safe travel facilities, the burden lay on the pilot to
show that he had been wrongly discharged. In so holding the
arbitrator realized that he was departing from the general rules:
"Whatever may be the true rules as to these matters [burden
of proof and degree] in ordinary cases, the paramount in-
terest of the public in safety would justify departure from
those rules in a case of the sort now before us."1
2 7
Under the circumstances, the departure from the ordinary rules
regarding burden of proof certainly appears proper.28  But what
24 For a specific example of a rejection of the notion that the union is the
party desiring the affirmative action see Swift & Co., 12 LA 108 (1948).
2r In Carbon Fuel Co., 1 ALAA par. 67, 327 (1946), the employee had the
burden of proof where the contract required him to show that he had been
" unjustly dealt with." Where the contract provides for probationary em-
ployees, these employees have the burden of showing arbitrary action by the
company if they are discharged during the probationary period. North Ameri-
can Aviation, Inc., 19 LA 565, 569 (1952).
26 19 LA 585, 587 (1952). 27 Ibid.
28 Here, as in the promotion cases, we must assume that burden of proof is
used to mean only risk of persuasion, since the union's evidence is chiefly
rebuttal.
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degree of public interest must be involved before the burden changes
hands? Does the public have a sufficient interest in the competency
of a bus driver? A munitions plant worker? The United, Air
Lines opinion is the first to suggest that a paramount public interest
may shift the burden, and since the case is of recent vintage there
is no certainty how far the doctrine will be carried.
In another recent case it seems to have been suggested that the
discharged employee should bear the burden of proof under some
circumstances because of the necessity of maintaining plant disci-
pline.29 In that case two employees were discharged for smoking.
At the hearing the only evidence was the testimony of a supervisor
who said he saw the violation and the testimony of the employees,
who denied that they had been smoking. Had the arbitrator chosen
simply to believe the supervisor instead of the discharged em-
ployees, his decision would have presented no problem for us. The
decision rests on a different basis:
"The union was unable to present positive proof to buttress
its case .... To rule against management in a case based
solely on the personal testimony of a member of the super-
visory staff as against the personal testimony of two em-
ployees could very well . . . jeopardize the responsibility
vested in those who direct and supervise .... ',0
This may be unfortunate language expressing a just result.
Taken at its face value, it indicates that where a supervisor accuses
an employee of a wrong which is cause for discharge, and the em-
ployee denied the accusation, the union has the burden of present-
ing evidence other than the testimony of the employee in order to
prevent discharge. This result may be explained by saying either
that the supervisory employee's testimony is always entitled to the
greater weight or that the testimony of the two men cancels out
and the union is left with the burden of presenting other evidence.
From either viewpoint the position is untenable. There is no reason
why an arbitrator should blind himself to the testimony in indi-
vidual cases by adhering to a strict rule that a supervisor's testi-
mony is always entitled to preference. Nor is there sufficient reason
to justify a departure from the general rule that burden of proof
in discharge cases should be placed on the company.
Grayson Heat Control Ltd.31 represents another situation where
211 Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), 19 LA. 795 (1952).
0 Id., p. 796.
3-12 LA 335 (1945).
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it is sometimes said that the union must bear the burden of showing
a discharge to be improper:
"Where there is substantial evidence justifying a conclusion
that the employer is opposed to organization of his employees
or has shown a previous hostile attitude to a labor organiza-
tion representing his employees, then it would appear that
the major burden of proof would be upon the employer....
But where, as in this case, there is substantial evidence justi-
fying a conclusion that the employer is not opposed to or-
ghnization of his employees . . . then it would appear that
the practical application ... is to hold the discharge proper
unless the evidence is very convincing that a finding of dis-
charge for just cause is arbitrary." 2
This logic has been accepted by other opinions and writers.88
On analysis, however, this does not mean that in any discharge
case the union has the initia burden of proof. What we are here
concerned with is the situation where the company has already
shown a sufficient reason to discharge and the union contends that
the discharge would still be unwarranted because discriminatory
toward union members or officials. The burden on the union is to
show discrimination sufficient to prevent an otherwise valid dis-
charge. The union does not have the burden of proving the dis-
charge improper from its inception. On the primary question, the
existence of a sufficient reason to discharge, the burden will remain
with the company.
As was true with regard to promotion and lay-off proceedings,
the cases involving discharge have failed to establish any certain
pattern regarding the 0'egree of proof to be required. The decisions
have spoken of "a fair preponderance of the evidence,' 4 "clear
and convincing proof,"3 5 "proof beyond a reasonable doubt," aG
"the weight of the evidence," 3 7 and evidence "sufficient to convince
a reasonable mind of guilt. " 38 The cases appear hopelessly irrecon-
32 d., p. 338.
3 Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 1 ALAA par. 67, 332 (1946) ; Bendix Avia-
tion Corp., 1 ALAA par. 67, 082 (1946); GOLLUB, op. cit. supra at note 2,
p. 15.
31 American Smelting & Refining Co., 7 LA 147, 150 (1947).
3 "Fairbanks Co., 20 LA 36 (1951); Aviation Maintenance Corp., 8 LA 261,
268 (1947).
30 American Smelting & Refining Co., 16 LA 416 (1950); Bethlehem Steel
Co., 2 LA 194, 196 (1945).
"7 Deere Manufacturing Co., 19 LA 203 (1952).
'1 Stoekham Pipe Fittings Co., 1 ALAA par. 67, 460 (1946).
BURDEN OF PROOF IN LABOR ARBITRATIONs 135
cilable, and it again must be questioned whether these verbal formu-
lations of the requisite burden of proof are helpful in proceedings
before arbitrators.
There is one line of decision in regard to quantum of proof
which merits consideration, however. Where discharge is based
upon an alleged criminal act, some arbitrators have analogized to
the criminal law and required proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 9
Such a heavy burden on the company is justified on the grounds
that discharge is the strongest economic penalty available, and
where a discharge is upheld on criminal grounds the worker's repu-
tation also suffers greatly. On the other hand, the analogy to
criminal law is not applied to civil cases based on criminal acts.
40
Arbitrations of labor disputes are more closely related to civil
actions than criminal proceedings in the type of sanctions imposed,
so why borrow quantum of proof requirements from criminal
actions? Still, the writers seem to have accepted "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" as the proper quantum where criminal actions are
the basis for the discharge. 41
Regardless of the particular word formulae used to express the
degree of proof necessary to sustain or overrule a discharge, it is
clear that burden of proof has been used in such a way as to show
that arbitrators are loath to impose a discharge, the ultimate pen-
alty available. Frequently the arbitrators have been willing to
impose a lesser penalty where they felt that the evidence was in-
sufficient to warrant discharge. 42 And an examination of the cases
certainly indicates that the degree of proof required to sustain a
discharge is greater than the degree of proof necessary to sustain
actions involving promotion and lay-off.
Conclusion
As has been noted, burden of proof will not be an important
factor in most arbitrations, affecting usually only the order of the
presentation of the evidence. Though it is impossible to tell, it
seems probable that in many cases burden of proof is merely used
as "icing on the cake" to buttress a decision reached without it.
30 A. S. Beck Shoe Corp., 2 LA 212 (1944) ; Continental Paper Co., 16 LA
727, 729 (1951).
'0 WI MORE, op. cit. supra at note 6, § 2497-2498.
1 GOLL]UB, op. cit supra at note 2, p. 16. Beck, op. cit. supra at note 2,
p. 90.
4" Brinks Inc., 19 LA 724 (1953); Axmen Berry Casing Co., 17 LA 179
(1950) ; Bethlehem Steel Co., 2 LA 194, 196 (1945).
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Certainly erroneous use of burden of proof by an arbitrator is not
grounds for judicial attack on his decision.43
Yet, there apparently are instances where burden of proof has
been, and will be, helpful. It would be too much to presume that
the concept is of no aid, in the face of the many cases in which it
has been argued and imposed. Moreover, the decisions regarding
burden of proof show a certain consistency, as this paper has at-
tempted to demonstrate. That consistency is in part due to the fact
that use of burdens has been controlled, to a large extent, by anal-
ogy to the principles used at law. At the same time, it shows that
the arbitrators have generally taken into account the factors pecu-
liar to labor disputes and arbitrations. For example, discharge
cases may be explained on the ground that the company has the
affirmative of the issue and should bear the burden of proving its
case. But that statement would mean little without the considera-
tions that discharge is the strongest economic punishment available
under a collective bargaining contract, and the reasons therefor
are best known to the company.
By attempting to set out the general lines along which decisions
regarding burdens have fallen, this paper does not intend to sug-
gest that there has been, or should be, any rigidification of the use
of burden of proof by arbitrators. One of the greatest values of
arbitration, admittedly, is flexibility. The decisions have value
only insofar as they show the reasons underlying the application of
burden of proof to different situations arising in arbitration
hearings.
That the decisions collected herein fall generally into certain
patterns should not be taken to indicate a rigidity in the approach
of arbitrators to the question of who should bear the burden in a
particular case. Rather, the great majority of opinions seem prop-
erly to have considered each case on the merits involved in the
situation. Such uniformity as has been reached appears to be more
the result of a like reasoning on similar situations than any ad-
herence to a fixed rule. Assuming that this flexibility in its appli-
cation will continue, our conclusion must be that burden of proof
is a proper and useful weapon in the armament of arbitrators.
," ELxouni, op. cit. supra at note 2, pp. 148-149.
